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1 
 
Empathy is a relatively new term in English.  According to the Oxford 
English Dictionary, it was first attested in 1904.  This is worth pondering.  
 
2 
 
Shakespeare never used the word.  Nor did Chaucer or Milton, Bacon or 
Bentham, the Bronte sisters, John Stuart Mill or Harriet Beecher Stowe.  
The philologist in me immediately wants to ask:  what did they use in its 
place?  Perhaps they used the French word.  No, empathie, according to Le 
Petit Robert, first appeared in French in 1903.  We find the same 
conspicuous absence in modern French literary, not to mention, moral 
history as we find in written English.  There is no empathie in any French 
writer from Montaigne to Molière, La Fontaine to Hugo. 
 
 
3 
 
Along philological lines, perhaps the question of what earlier writers used 
“in place of” empathy is incorrectly formed.  Words come into existence in 
specific historical circumstances:  under definite cultural, political, and 
sometimes disciplinary conditions.  As David Depew makes clear, this is the 
case with empathy.1  Initially it was a technical term that grew out of the 
discipline of aesthetic psychology at the end of the nineteenth and beginning 
of the twentieth centuries. 
 
 
4 
 
This means that asking what Shakespeare or Milton might have used in 
place of empathy is a little like asking what they might have used in place of 
disposable razor or better yet post-it note.  The term did not exist in their 
day because in the narrow, technical sense of its origin in the early twentieth 
century, the concept had not yet come into being. 
 
 
5 
 
There is another, more radical claim that this absence makes available:  that 
the assertive projection of one’s own feelings into another’s imagined 
perspective, which is the activity of empathy (from the German Einfühlung), 
came into being more or less contemporarily with the term itself.  Sympathy 
( Mitleid) had implied a generally accessible set of human sensibilities that 
two or more people might tap simultaneously – through music, for instance.  
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In the realm of moral philosophy, sympathy came to be seen as a notion 
belonging to the Romantic imagination.  By the latter nineteenth century, 
this view had begun to seem naïve, quaint.  The more dramatic, even 
aggressive practice of empathizing with another can thus be understood as 
an attempt to break through the more thoroughly individuated selves of late 
modernity.  These selves are increasingly seen as lacking any universally 
available, “sympathetically vibrating” realm in common.  David Depew 
suggests that empathy is a “repair concept.”  My assertion differs only a 
little.  The conditions of modernity, including the development of what 
Alasdair MacIntyre has called the “autonomous moral agent,” facilitated the 
rise of the more aggressive “entering into” of another’s psyche.  This 
compensates in part for the loss of an outside realm where psyches of 
various kinds could come together in the earlier world of sympathy.2 
 
6 
 
There is, however, a more popular usage of empathy as a term.  It can make 
the assertion that “Shakespeare did not know empathy” seem absurd.  The 
term did not remain fixed within the narrow confines of its origin.  This 
happens with technical terms all the time.  They move outward from a 
definite locale of technical usage and become diffuse.  They “interface” with 
a larger culture and resonate with more general concerns that have a much 
longer histories than the technical term itself.  In this connection, asking 
what Shakespeare used in place of empathy might be perfectly reasonable.  
The meaning at issue would not be technical but colloquial.  To popularize 
the use of empathy can be to bring it closer in meaning to other, more 
familiar terms with longer histories of usage in English:  perhaps sympathy, 
possibly compassion, maybe pity or consolation or some combination of 
creative imaginings of other people’s feelings that is nothing if not 
Shakespearean.3 
 
 
7 
 
I routinely assume that empathy, in this more democratic sense of co-feeling 
or compassion, is central to experiences in reading fiction.  I am not alone in 
this, although my particular assumption undoubtedly has to do with the 
kind of fiction I most frequently study:  the nineteenth-century realism in 
literature that includes the long novels of Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Gogol, and 
Turgenev as well as their West European contemporaries from Balzac and 
Dickens to Flaubert, Eliot, and Henry James. 
 
 
8 
 
The empathic impulse in reading such works seems almost a given, though 
the key term in Anglo-American critical discourse has historically been 
identification rather than empathy.  We readers have long talked about 
identifying with fictional figures painted in great detail.  We say we identify 
with their sorrows and joys, their ethical dilemmas, their dramatized lives.  
We even measure the effectiveness, the quality, of fictional works by how 
well they get us to identify with their characters, to care about them, to feel 
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with them, to feel for them. 
 
9 
 
This manner of reading and judging works has persisted.  In at least one 
crucial way, it depends on a realist or neo-realist assumption about 
depiction.  Writing that anticipates empathic responses in the readers is 
supposed to fool people, or allow them to fool themselves temporarily, into 
seeing its combinations of graphemes as real beings.  In this sense, it is 
something like the trick of showing two dimensions of space as three 
dimensions in pictorial representation.  (Thus the “flat” representation of 
medieval icons can be thought of as more honest because it doesn’t try to 
delude people about its own two-dimensionality.) 
 
 
10 
 
Part of this illusionary quality of realist and neo-realist depiction is the 
convention of having no conventions, merely telling the truth, perhaps 
despite the beautifying (and falsifying) conventions of storytelling.  “I may 
not be a very good writer, but luckily that shouldn’t matter, since I’m merely 
laying out the truth in all its ugly detail.”  Or “I wish Mr. Newman had not 
said such things, but I would be lying to you if I pretended that he hadn’t.”  
Identifying or empathizing with the characters in realist or other fiction 
depends to a great extent on the willingness of readers to accept the claim of 
a-conventionality that such a narrative convention implies. 
 
 
11 
 
This point is especially evident when we consider that many experimental 
modernist or post-modernist texts may or may not elicit identification with 
characters and may or may not be intended to do so.  Among the most 
vehement, and entertaining, of modernist reactions against identification as 
the end all of literature was that of Vladimir Nabokov.  He relegated those of 
us who seek identification to the status of “minor readers,” presumably by 
analogy with minor characters.4 
 
 
12 
 
But this only reinforces my claim, for the modernist reaction has been 
strongest where the realist tradition took firmest root.  It is no surprise, 
therefore, to find Nabokov hacking away at it.  Indeed the identificatory 
manner of reading is still strongly with us.  The fact is that if we pick up a 
fiction-writing book from the shelf of a local book store the first and most 
constant message on characters will be that the writer must get readers to 
believe in and care about them as if they were real. 
 
 
13 
 
Mikhail Bakhtin explored this phenomenon in many of his works, early and 
late.  He dismissed “mere empathy,” by which he meant something like 
“emotional identification,” as unhelpful and essentially sterile.  “What would 
I have to gain if another were to fuse with me?” he asked.  Another person 
“would see and know only what I already see and know, he would only 
repeat in himself the inescapable closed circle of my own life; let him rather 
remain outside me.”5 
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14 
 
For new understanding to be possible, Bakhtin proposed to replace talk of 
emotional identification with something his early writings call vzhivanie.  
This is from the root zhit’ (to live) and the prefix v (in, or more likely in this 
case, into).  The neologism has been translated by Gary Saul Morson and 
Caryl Emerson as “live entering” or “living into.”  The idea is to enter actively 
into another individuality, another perspective on the world – without losing 
sight even momentarily of one’s own unique perspective, one’s own 
“surplus” of life experience, one’s own sense of self.6  This is a relatively early 
formulation of what he would eventually come to discuss under the rubric of 
“dialogue,” his great discovery and the central concept in much of his work.7 
 
 
15 
 
Several things are noteworthy about vzhivanie.  First, it is not a translation 
of empathy but an alternative to it.  In a later essay of 1952-53, Bakhtin used 
a very different term for this:  “creative understanding.”8  But the emphasis 
is still on maintaining one’s own perspective within another’s life 
circumstances.  To put it the other way around, “creative understanding” 
means entertaining a view of oneself that comes from outside.  Bakhtin’s 
thorough familiarity with the literature of empathic aesthetics suggests that 
he was attempting to go beyond “feeling into” by “living into.”9 
 
 
16 
 
Second, vzhivanie moves from aesthetics to ethics.  This kind of active 
engagement with another’s experience dovetails strikingly with Bakhtin’s 
discussion of Dostoevsky’s fiction.  For Bakhtin, Dostoevsky’s novels are 
ethical testing grounds, with surrogate life experiences that can serve as 
material for vzhivanie, which Bakhtin discussed under the heading of 
polyphony.  He also argued that Dostoevsky undermined crudely 
instrumental approaches to literature, which Bakhtin addressed under the 
heading of Menippean Satire.  Whether Bakhtin’s vzhivanie was inspired by 
Dostoevsky or devised to account for his artistic practice is difficult to say.  
Still the two writers share a way of engaging ethical questions through 
aesthetic categories that keeps them among the most compelling thinkers on 
the relation of art and life.10 
 
 
17 
 
Third, vzhivanie in Bakhtin’s terms is uncanny in describing how American 
undergraduates read realist and neo-realist works.  Yet uncanny might not 
be the word here, for Bakhtin tended to treat the descriptive technique of 
novels in the mid- to late-nineteenth century as a culmination of sorts in 
literary history.  He held this particularly for character depiction, especially 
in the case of Dostoevsky.  Thus it is not surprising that ideas Bakhtin 
developed elsewhere have great relevance for experiences of reading 
realists.  His interpretive keys are made to fit nineteenth-century locks. 
 
 
18 
 
Reading experiences, however, are not the same as their critical 
explications.  Readers often become absorbed by fictional works, 
“aesthetically enraptured” by them as Murray Krieger put it.11  Critics step  
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away, distance themselves to explicate emotional responses.  They also reify, 
appropriate, synthesize, and evaluate.  All these moves emphasize the 
outsider judgment of critics over the insider identification of readers. 
 
19 
 
At this point, the reasons behind the title of this tour – and the oxymoronic 
nature of empathic criticism – should become evident.  Bakhtin seemed to 
meld the two activities:  the absorption or enrapturing of the reader with the 
reflection or explication of the critic.  His notion of vzhivanie attempts to 
unify and integrate.  It is a vision of active wholeness – of psychological, 
social, and moral health.  We might speculate political health as well, 
especially for a marginal intellectual, like Bakhtin, living in Soviet society of 
the 1920s and ’30s, which suffered an increasingly schizophrenic celebration 
of High Stalinist culture with awareness of the gulag growing beneath.  
Soviet politics or no, Bakhtin clearly intended vzhivanie then “creative 
understanding” as socially curative concepts.  They were meant to help us 
think through problems of ethical engagement where literary texts mark 
contemporary problems and measure their potential solutions. 
 
 
20 
 
There is another kind of engagement with literature that might serve such a 
curative purpose.  It nullifies in a different manner the oxymoron of 
empathic criticism.  Bakthin seemed to dismiss it, but I think he did it a 
disservice.12  I am thinking of literary translation.  Translation plies a middle 
ground between readerly identification, which is essentially mute, and 
critical distance with its plethora of words.  This is translation as individual 
and cultural practice, in the usage first proposed by Alasdair MacIntyre.  A 
practice aims at the goods internal to its activities while extending human 
powers to “achieve excellence.” “To enter into a practice is to enter into a 
relationship not only with its contemporary practitioners, but also with 
those who have preceded us in the practice, particularly those whose 
achievements extended the reach of the practice to its present point.  It is 
thus the achievement, and a fortiori the authority, of a tradition which I 
then confront and from which I have to learn.”13  This view presupposes the 
subjection of one’s understanding of a work to standards of the practice 
rather than privileging, as the dominant strain in Anglo-American critical 
explication has tended to do, one’s own interpretive inventions. 
 
 
21 
 
About translation as individual practice, I merely observe that the works I 
feel I know best yet elicit from me the fewest comments are those I have 
translated.  When asked to say something about them, I identify with Lev 
Tolstoy, who once wrote to the philosopher Nikolai Strakhov, “If I wanted to 
express in words everything I planned to express through my novel, I would 
have to write anew from the beginning the very same novel I wrote.”14  In 
this sense, the activity of translation is the pinnacle of creative 
understanding. 
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22 
 
About translation as cultural practice, I may simply cite the paucity of 
literary translations published in the United States.  The remarkably small 
number of translated literary works (compared to other countries or 
compared to U.S. publications overall) indicates a lack of American 
emphasis on creative understanding or vzhivanie.  Yet clearly we, too, could 
benefit from “live entering” in Bakhtin’s sense – that is, from empathy in a 
larger, more constructive use – especially where differences between our 
perspectives and those of people living outside our borders are greatest. 
 
 
 
 
© Russell Scott Valentino, 2005. 
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